(This is an extract from my thesis draft. I thought I’d post it on the blog. Please note that it’s abstract philosophy in a very abstruse and technical area, unconnected to the social commentary that makes up most of this blog, so um… yeah, if you try to read it don’t be surprised if your response is “WTF”. It’s also very much in draft form. Comments would be greatly welcome)


In the currently thriving field of first-order ontology, the most popular view is heavyweight, realism, with a minority of lightweight realists and anti-realists. Outside the field of ontology, deflationary views are widespread, with many non-ontologists being skeptical of the heavyweight realism that has become common in the field. It is natural to suppose that there is some sort of selection effect at work here: those who think that ontological questions are deep questions with determinate answers are much more likely to go into ontology than those who think that the questions are shallow or lack objective answers.

-David Chalmers, ontological anti realism

Dedicated to the first field of human intellectual endeavor to invent and seriously argue for a doctrine named crazyism,metametaphysics. May we soon find a cure.


Context for mid-year review
Anti-metaphysics, a very partial bibliographic survey of not trusting metaphysics
It creates unnecessary stress and worry about ceaseless problems.
It intrudes on the territory of revealed religion.
It claims to provide knowledge unsupported by experience.
It reflects the interests of various groups in society, and of the present social situation.
It reflects the interests of various groups in society, and of the present social situation.
It doesn’t seem to be going anywhere
A note on “metaphysics”
What is anti-metaphysics?
Varieties of anti-metaphysics
Light-weight realism
Pluralism formalized
What’s so special about pluralism anyway?
Varieties of pluralism
Formal ontology

0. Context for annual review

This paper is a modified version of the chapter I use to lay out the conceptual landscape of my topic. While the amount of work on meta-ontology and metametaphysics is increasing, the field seems, if anything, more confusing than ever. My goal in this chapter is to achieve some degree of clarity about different approaches to metametaphysics. In particular I am interested in those approaches which are opposed to what I would term the standard approach. This paper is a survey paper. Thus it aims to map logical space, (and to some degree the existing and historical literature) rather than find our location within it.

1. Introduction

In this chapter, I introduce the anti-metaphysical tradition and pluralism. I begin by considering some considerations for anti-metaphysics. We then discuss what is meant by metaphysics and anti-metaphysics, before going on to catalogue the different kinds of anti-metaphysics. We then come to a discussion of pluralism, providing a formal definition that, with modifications, we will use for the rest of the thesis. After discussing the virtues of pluralism as an account we go on to describe it’s varieties. Finally we briefly review formal ontology.

2. Anti-metaphysics, a very partial bibliographic survey of not trusting metaphysics

While the reasons for doubting metaphysics are as many as those whom have doubted it, we will consider six.

2.1. Metaphysics creates unnecessary stress and worry

The view that good philosophy is a kind of therapy for the problems thrown up by its bad, speculative branches has been around for a long time. The skeptics of ancient Greece searched for ataraxia or an inner peace of mind flowing from the suspension of belief (Sextus, 2000). Presumably this was (at least in part) a response to the tumult of metaphysics which was accumulating at the time.

Much later on Wittgenstein claimed that philosophy should act as a kind of therapy. His pupil Anscombe (1981) gave an interesting account of such therapy in action. She wrote that she had always detested phenomenalism, never believing it but nonetheless feeling trapped by it. Ultimately she found an escape from it via Wittgenstein’s methods. For one skeptical of metaphysics on these grounds, it is a kind of psychological tangle, rather than a puzzle in the ordinary sense.

2.2. Metaphysics intrudes on the territory of revealed religion.

St Paul writes: “See to it that no one takes you captive by philosophy and empty deceit, according to human tradition, according to the elemental spirits of the world, and not according to Christ.” Colossians 2:8 (authorship disputed, 2007).

In the thriving intellectual culture found in this period of the Roman empire, Christianity was considered rather philosophically base. This quote then is mostly likely a call to the Christian people of the small city of Colossae not to fall under the sway of the often quite sophisticated and relatively naturalistic metaphysics of the popular stoic philosophers contemporary at that time.

Later, in the medieval ages the Arabic theologian Al-Ghazâlî (2000) wrote “The Incoherence of the Philosophers” as a way of beating off the advance of the Arabian interpreters of Plato and Aristotle whom he saw as intruding into the proper domain of faith.

Similar concerns about metaphysics and analogous modes of inquiry can be found in many other religions. It’s not difficult to guess at what’s going on here, metaphysics comes dangerously close to the topics of revealed religion, but with a very different methodology and often with very different answers.

2.3. Metaphysics claims to provide knowledge unsupported by experience.

Metaphysics at least seems to go beyond experience. This has been bothering philosophers since the British empiricists and probably much earlier. Hume (1999) made the point with particular urgency:

If we take into our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Consign it then to the flames: For it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion

In somewhat more recent times this concern was revived by the logical positivists. Ayer (1946) writes:

“We may begin by criticising the metaphysical thesis that philosophy affords us knowledge of a reality transcending the world of science and common sense.”

Two prominent (and connected) challenges to this line of thought against metaphysics are:

1) That it’s difficult to avoid throwing the baby out with the bathwater, insomuch as drawing a line between “good” science and commonsense and “bad” metaphysics can prove difficult. And,
2) That perhaps metaphysical theorising can in fact draw support from experience.

The prospects of empiricist criticism depend on meeting these points, both of which in the potted history of analytic philosophy are usually sourced to Quine (1951).

2.4. Metaphysics merely reflects the interests of various groups in society, or the structure of the present social situation.

The classical case of a philosopher who thinks that metaphysics is purely reflective of the prevailing level of social development, and not reality, is of course Karl Marx (2000). Marx is far from being the only thinker to have argued this position, Auguste Comte (1975) also thought that there was an inevitable process of social development away from metaphysics, representing simultaneously a development in human thought, and in the social organisation of society. While for Comte, metaphysics is an advance upon previous “theological” modes of thinking, it too must be thrown to the dustbin of history in favour of a new “positive” mode of thought.

How fair it is to debunk metaphysics on this basis is debatable. It’s unclear that speculating on the sociological role of various theories is a strong argument against their accuracy. Similar attempts to undermine the epistemic honor granted to science by explaining different theories as being purely a function of social currents haven’t swayed very many (Hacking 1999).

2.5. Metaphysics is an attempt to think about matters we were not built to contemplate.

Very soon after Darwinism was first expounded, there arose a tradition which attempted to debunk various human institutions and beliefs in light of evolutionary science. Soon after Darwin discussed the evolution of human morality in The Descent of Man (1871), arguments were put forth that this could only result in the debunking of morality (Mivart 1871).

Metaphysics seems especially ripe for debunking though. Other forms of epistemic endeavor seem to bear a much closer relationship to skills that an organism needs to navigate it’s environment than metaphysics. At the very least there’s no obvious direct way that evolution could select for propensity to be an accurate metaphysician. This argument can be seen as a far more selective (and thus perhaps far more plausible) version of Plantinga’s (2003) evolutionary argument for skepticism.

Recently Chomsky (2009) among others has argued that certain problems around the metaphysics of mind simply cannot be resolved on the basis that we simply haven’t got the right bits of cognitive architecture to comprehend the answer.

Thus far we have been thinking around the notion of what humans are built to contemplate diachronicially. The methodology goes, we tell some story about how the evolutionary past determines this or that cognitive capacity of humans. (No need for presentism on the savannah! No mereological nihilists among the monkeys!), and make a pessimistic assesment of the possibilities of metaphysics.

We can strip out this diachronic element out though, leaving only a general argument based around present cognitive architecture and the limitations it imposes. This synachronic debunking based on the limitations of our cognition is Kant’s (1998) project when he considers the antinomies of reason.

2.6. Metaphysics doesn’t seem to be going anywhere

In my view this is by far the most compelling of the arguments. It is very difficult to find an example of a metaphysical problem which is now regarded as solved. Perhaps the invention of calculus solved some of Xeno’s paradoxes of change and motion, but even this is a little unclear. Often ideas gain wide currency, and are then rejected decisively. Sometimes after being rejected decisively, they are then picked up again. David Chalmers (2011) reviews some empirical evidence and summaries the sentiments of those in the field concerning progress in philosophy generally- his conclusion is that it’s raining heavily and the medium term forecast is not very good either.

This argument is similar to the pessimistic meta-induction in the empirical sciences (the argument that the historical record suggests that even the best scientific theories will be rejected, Laudan 1984), but it is a good deal worse insomuch as at least with the sciences, the historical record is more debatable. In metaphysics it seems fairly obvious that not much progress has been made.

The customary retort is that at least a lot of bad positions have been rejected. However, it’s not clear this is true. As mentioned above, it’s not uncommon for views to be dumped than picked up again (witness the revival of scholastic metaphysics for example). Even if it were true though that many once important positions have been rejected it’s unclear how much progress is really made by a process of scratching out positions. Especially since it seems clear that the size of logical space and our possible options is expanding over time, not shrinking.

3. A note on “metaphysics”

Often critics of metaphysics provide no clear definition of what they mean by the term “metaphysics”. Ayer (1946) for example seems to have regarded metaphysics as being that philosophy which is transcendental, i.e. that philosophy which goes beyond experience. He therefore rejects it, as he is against attempts to go beyond the bounds of “science” and “commonsense” through philosophy. This seems to be quite a common pattern in the history of objections to metaphysics, one constructs an objection to some class of intellectual pursuits and then labels that class of intellectual disputes metaphysics.

I wish to continue this dubious tradition of avoiding giving a clear definition of metaphysics, but in a self conscious vein. In order to have found something interesting, it is enough to show the validity of some anti-metaphysical analysis for a significant class of problems commonly termed “metaphysical”. There is no need for us to draw a neat and non arbitrary boundary which includes all those problems usually regarded as metaphysical, and then to find those problems inside the boundary of metaphysics to be defective.

The reason for talking about anti-metaphysics, as opposed to anti-aesthetics, or anti-meta-ethics, or some other field, is primarily historical and sociological. Metaphysics is the name of the field various philosophers have taken themselves to be denouncing whatever that might be. Thus we use the word “metaphysics” because part of our project is to examine and classify those who have considered themselves opposed to “metaphysics” on their own terms. While many of these philosophers may have felt that there is some clear and malign essence which makes a problem metaphysical, we needn’t follow them in that respect.

In summary, I strongly suspect that metaphysics is a largely arbitrary grab-bag of problems and issues united at best by family resemblance, such that no one analysis applies to it’s totality. Nonetheless I use the term advisedly, so as to focus on a historical and ongoing critique.

It may be useful to give a few paradigm cases of disputes often regarded as metaphysical in order to show the rough scope of what I and these authors are talking about. Here are a few chosen more or less at random. The dispute over whether the past and the future exist, the dispute over what makes objects that are similar in some respect (say redness) similar, the dispute over what if, anything, makes counter-factual statements true or false.

4. What is anti-metaphysics?

By anti-metaphysics, I mean roughly meta-philosophical positions which deny what I term the standard model of meta-metaphysics. According to the standard model, for any particular metaphysical problem there is a unique solution which alone is true, and which is at least in principle knowable to be true. It’s also seen as very much a live question as to which of several different solutions to a metaphysical problem is correct, and these solutions are taken to picture very different worlds from each other. Chalmers (2009) calls the what I call the standard view, “heavy-weight realism”. How standard the standard view is as a matter of census list popularity, among metaphysicians and among philosophers generally, is probably debatable. But nonetheless the standard view does seem to be standard in the sense of having some sort of hegemony. Even if a majority of philosophers don’t believe (at least without serious reservations), a majority of philosophers think that a majority of philosophers believe it.

In action, the standard view of metaphysics is very simple. What would a partisan for the standard view say about persistence over time? On the standard view of metaphysics there is a correct answer to this question, and it’s something we can know. Further, different answers to this question really make a difference- what we imagine when we imagine a perdurantist world really is very different to what we imagine when we imagine an endurantist world.

5. Varieties of anti-metaphysics

While an incredulous attitude towards metaphysics, here termed “anti-metaphysics” is sometimes treated as an undifferentiated mush, there is probably more variety within the camp of the anti-metaphysicians than there is without it. The contemporary revival of interest in meta-ontology presents such a rich variety of views that it is very nearly the case that there is one per author. What follows is a far from exhaustive categorisation of anti-metaphysical approaches.

2.1. Metaphysical Skepticism

Skepticism is the view that, while there is a fact of the matter as to what solution to a metaphysical problem is correct, we’ve no chance of working out which. One might come to this conclusion from a number of different approaches including certain kinds of empiricism and a pessimistic meta-induction on the discipline of metaphysics. One of the more recent papers is by Krigel (2013) and argues that revisionary metaphysics has a severe epistemic difficulty insomuch as at least in some cases it’s just completely unclear how we could find out the truth about a problem.

For a formal formal definition I would propose:

Skepticism about a problem q is true iff, there exists x such that x is a correct solution to q AND if y is a correct solution to q, x equals y AND it is unknowable that x is the correct solution to q.

2.2. Light-weight realism

Light-weight realists believe that while of course there are correct answers to metaphysical questions, these answers reflect “conceptual truths rather than the furniture of the world.” (Chalmers 2009).

Formal definition :

Light-weight realism is true about metaphysics iff, for all x, if x is a metaphysical commitment, then x is really only about our concepts and not the structure of the world.

It would seem that lightweight realism is directly compatible with a number of the other approaches discussed here, including pluralism, trivialism and subjectivism.

2.3. Dissolutionism

Modern dissolutionism starts with Wittgenstein and the positivists. The positivists believed that metaphysical problems are merely pseudo problems, content-less garbles of words, because they fail to have empirical content. As such they aimed to dissolve rather than solve these problems.

The early Wittgenstein (1961) concurred1, writing that most philosophical problems are attempts to move outside the bounds of what can be said. The later Wittgenstein (1953) thought that the problem with metaphysics was that it created pseudo-problems by trapping us within a fly bottle of language.

Attempts to dissolve metaphysics are often thought to be caught up in the outmoded empiricisms of yesteryear. However philosophers such as Kant, Marx and the late Wittgenstein who are not empiricists in any conventional certainly believe in dissolving rather than solving metaphysical problems.

A formal definition might be:

Dissolutionism about a problem q is true iff there does not exist x such that x is a correct solution to q.

Alternately it could be:

Dissolutionism about an apparent problem qis true iff q is not a real problem

2.4. Mysterianism

Mysterianism has mostly been developed with respect to the philosophy of mind. In principle though there’s no reason it couldn’t be applied to any part of metaphysics.

Noam Chomsky (2009), a prominent advocate of mysterianism, argues that the so called “hard problem of consciousness” (i.e. the ontology and metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness) may simply be unsolvable for us given our cognitive architecture. This approach is similar to skepticism, but differs from it insomuch as while skepticism says we cannot pick between different candidate answers, mysterianism suggests that whatever the answer is, we may not be able to understand it.

This approach has a certain native plausibility as whatever our ancestors were selected for, they were certainly not selected for anything like their insight into the reality or otherwise of numbers. Nonetheless it suffers a weaknesses. It seems difficult to see how one could establish that there exists an answer to a problem, but it is necessarily incomprehensible. The simplest method would be to construct such a solution, but it’s difficult to see how this could be done without understanding it. Otherwise, proving that whatever the solution is to a problem, we won’t be able to understand it, seems tricky. Still it’s difficult to deny that the idea has a certain charm. There is a natural plausibility to the notion that there are real and important states of affairs humans simply cannot underestand, after all, it would seem to be something of a miracle if it just so happened that humans could understand all of the important truths, or answer all of the important questions we tend to raise.

Formal definition:

Mysterianism about a problem q is true iff, there exists x such that x is a correct solution to q AND if y is a correct solution to q, x equals y AND x is incomprehensible.

2.5. Equivalence

Equivalence proposals suggest that for some problem, some set of seemingly contradictory proposed solutions to that problem are equivalent. Usually by equivalent is meant that no state of affairs could tell for one theory against the other. As more and more moving parts are added onto theories to shield them from criticisms bought against them by their rivals this view gains a certain plausibility. Miller (2005) holds that three and four dimensionalism about persistence are equivalent. While I’ve been unable to find any papers saying so, a number of philosophers have suggested in personal conversation that they think eternalism and presentism are, when sufficiently elaborated, equivalent.


Equivalence about two proposed solutions x & y, to a problem q is true iff x & y bear the same content.

It isn’t difficult to define equivalence between two theories, but it’s more difficult to define a notion of equivalentism, or a general stance that metaphysical positions about the same problem are equivelant.
This is because it seems fairly implausible to think that any two arbitrary metaphysical positions on any problem you like are equivalent.

If I have a theory of similarity that says that two things can be similar in some respect because miniature elephants carry back and forwards similarity particles very quickly, it seems unlikely that this theory will turn out to be equivalent to nominalism or trope theory. If we want to create a generalized ontological stance out of equivalence, we might define equivelentism it as the suspicion that a great many positions on a great many debates in ontology are in fact equivalent under close scrutiny.

2.6. Trivialism

The trivialist believes that for pretty much any ontological question does there exist a category of things x the answer is perfectly obvious. Their are two kinds of trivialism, yes-ism and no-ism. The yes-ist, also known as the maximalist, (Eklund 2009) believes that for pretty much every category of things we talk about, they exist. Thus for them existence questions are just not that interesting.

The no-ist believes that the answer to pretty much all questions of the form does there exist a category of things x is no, save perhaps one category, physical things (if one wants an even tougher theory one can restrict physical things to metaphysical simples). In other words, they endorse an incredibly sparse ontology.

Whether or not trivialism is a form of anti-metaphysics is perhaps open to debate. It’s included here for the sake of completeness.

Formally, and following on from Eklund’s account we define maximalism as follows:

Trivial yes-ism is true iff for all conceivable x, if x meets some minimal criteria of empirical tenability and internal coherence, than x exists.

For no-ism

Trivial no-ism is true iff for all x, x is a physical object.

2.7. Subjectivism

There’s a possible view which may be as respectable as any other, subjectivism. I’ve yet to find a philosopher whom endorses subjectivism, which strikes me as odd insomuch as it’s significantly more sane than many other ideas which have been endorsed in the literature on metametaphysics [if the review panel know of any metametaphysicians whose work is broadly subjectivist I’d be interested to hear about them].

According to subjectivism, proposed resolutions to metaphysical problems are not really statements about the world, but are instead statements about my mental states. There’s an enormous array of ways this could be cashed out, but one that immediately comes to mind is that metaphysical statements are actually statements about how I sort and catalogue information about the world.

On this account, when you ask “does the past exist”, your question is really about how you organise certain types of information. When I ask “does the past exist” the question is about how I catalogue types of information. Thus if I say “yes it does” and you say “no it does not”, we’ve not provided two answers to one question, but rather an answer each for two separate questions. An answer is right only if it appropriately reflects the way you think.

2.8. Pluralism

Pluralism is the primary class of view we will be concerned with in this thesis. Roughly it is the view that there are multiple correct answers to metaphysical problems. The reader may be wondering, is subjectivism about metaphysics a species of pluralism about metaphysics? Not quite, though the two doctrines are related. On a subjectivist account there is still only one correct solution to any given metaphysical question, thus it doesn’t meet the primary criterion of pluralism.

6. Pluralism formalized

Formalising pluralism is a little more difficult than formalising the other varieties of anti-metaphysics we have discussed.

In order for pluralism about a problem q to be true, there must be at least two solutions to that problem which are:

1. Mutually incompatible
2. Equally correct
3. Maximally correct relative to all other solutions
4. All reasonably assertable2

The first condition ensures that there is more than one solution in the relevant set of solutions, call this condition diversity. The second ensures that none of these solutions is better than the others, call this condition equality. The third condition ensures that there are no better solutions outside this set, call this condition maximality. The fourth condition, called naturally enough assert-ability, ensures that simply claiming that all solutions to a problem are incorrect does not count as a form of pluralism.

The overall result is that there are multiple genuinely distinct solutions to q. Each of these solutions is on par with each other solution, and collectively they are “as good as it gets”, each of them is also a reasonable position to assert.

7. What’s so wonderful about pluralism?

Pluralism as a view in metametaphysics has a number of properties you might think are desirable. It gives credence to the idea that certain metaphysical debates are ultimately unresolvable (or at least do not have a unique resolution) However it still provides a basis on which metaphysical investigation can continue, viz the mapping out of all maximally correct positions, it acknowledges our inclination to seek to understand different metaphysical possibilities. In other words, it would be a kind of philosopher’s paradise if it were right because it would do justice both to those motivations that made us skeptical of metaphysics, and those motivations which draw us into metaphysical dialectic.

8. Varieties of pluralism

1. Interpretations inconsistent with classical logic: inconsistency & relativism

1.1. Inconsistency

There’s a very simple way to meet the requirements of the definition of pluralism. If it is possible to have different solutions to a metaphysical problem, logically inconsistent with each other, multiple of which are true then the requirements of pluralism are met. This seems a little unsatisfactory on it’s face, as it gives up on non-contradiction, surely a desideratum for a philosophical theory. Perhaps, though, it is not entirely baseless. While it might be quite distressing to find that the earth is both round and not round, contradictions in the more shadowy realm of the metaphysical might seem a bit less troublesome. Still if we can’t rely on non-contradiction as a criterion for theory selection, what are we left with? Perhaps best to put this option aside.

1.2. Relativism

Perhaps slightly less jarringly, one can relativise the notion of truth. Thus rather than saying that a solution is true or false independent of context, the question of who is uttering the proposed solution becomes indispensable to evaluating whether it is correct or incorrect. No two contradictory theories need be true as said by some speaker. There remains multiple solutions at the maximum degree of correctness as uttered by some speaker (whether this requires the redesign of the conditions outlined in the formal definition, or merely a particular interpretation is debatable.) Thus solution x can be true when uttered by Bob and solution y be true when uttered by Phoebe.

2. Interpretations consistent with classical logic: non-cognitivism & fictionalism

2.1. Non-cognitivism

On non-cognitivist view, solutions to a problem do not have a truth value. However they may vary on some other quality such as “usefulness”. The term “correct” used in the formal definition above will then be interpreted to to mean useful. Exactly what the notion of usefulness amounts to is in need of clarification. Presumably qualities like painting a poetic picture of the world will not count as usefulness whereas allowing for the elegant construction of scientific theories might. For the moment let us note that it’s quite difficult to spell out this difference.

It also seems unlikely that usefulness will be context invariant. As a result, we’ll have to tweak the definition of pluralism in order to make it workable, relativising the solutions to a context. We will save the details for later chapters.

But doesn’t it seem like metaphysical theses are statements about the way the world is? While most of us do have this intuition, there might be ways of thinking about metaphysical frameworks which render their being non-cognitive plausible. Consider a map. On the map one finds terrain, but also a key and a scale. In a sense the key and the scale are not part of the map, but instead they act as a series of rules to render the map meaningful. Perhaps metaphysics is like the key and scale on a map, it structures our theories of the world, but does not itself involve any commitments to the world being a particular way. On this view then, the difference between two incompatible metaphysics is rather like the difference between cataloging one’s books alphabetically, or via the Dewey decimal system, the resulting picture of the world has the same content. Later in the thesis we will discuss this kind of non-cognitivism as a way of interpreting Carnap’s (1950) notion of different ontologies as different linguistic frameworks.

2.2. Fictionalism

Fictionalism claims that all solutions to metaphysical problems are false, but that some may be useful. For most purposes it is a variation on non-cognitivism. We take it that all the solutions are equally false, but we tie the notion of correctness to something like usefulness instead, so the falsity of the solutions is largely an irrelevancy.

9. Formal ontology

Formal ontology attempts to create systems for cataloging things which are algorithmically tractable, and which have sufficient power to accomplish various goals. Almost invariably formal ontological schemes are created for use by computers. They are often highly specific and purpose dependent.

Formal ontologists often acknowledge a debt to philosophical ontologists, and may draw upon their work. The primary difference though is that the formal ontologist is rarely concerned with searching for the “correct” ontology (unless correct is understood pragmatically) and is instead more interested in searching for an ontology which is sufficiently powerful and tractable for a specific computational context.

It’s a natural thought then that there’s some harmony between the outlook of the working formal ontologist, and the meta-ontology of pluralism. Whether the harmony of practical technique between pluralist metametaphysics and the relatively successful science of formal ontology can be used to defend pluralism or something like it is a matter we will consider in later chapters.

10. Conclusions

Anti-metaphysical positions have fewer commonalities than differences. If one could point to some common thread running between them, it would probably be practical, a doubtfulness about the utility of the value of continuing the game of metaphysics, at least as it’s currently played.

If anti-metaphysics is particularly icohate it may be because of it’s motivations. These represent as much as anything else a nagging dissatisfaction with the way things are being carried on, often arising at 3AM.

Pluralism seems to fit with the nerve of these motivations, whilst also respecting the reasons that drew us to metaphysics in the first place. However the pluralist views we have discussed seem far from ideal. Those that are inconsistent with classical logic seem to require mental calenthestics to be plausible, whereas those that aren’t face their serious questions.


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About timothyscriven

I study philosophy at Sydney University. In the grand scheme, I'm not very important.
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5 Responses to Meta-ontology

  1. Jonny. says:

    I’m up to 2.8 but just wanted to comment on your claim that Subjectavism is NOT a species of Pluraliam. I don’t think that’s right Tim, certainly not for the reason you gave. Some of the other views also yield only a single answer, yet they are part of the Pluralism “species”. Remember that is is Pluralism that allows for MULTIPLE theories – those theories don’t have to be multifarious. The idea that on of the theories demands a single solution to metaphysical problems, does not exclude it from Pluralisms view that many theories could be right. I say that even though it has not been made clear whether pluralism demands that each theory within the Pluralism fold – or “species” needs to be an equal solution to each other theory within that Pluralist family. I would perhaps consider myself a pluralist, a light realist, a mysteryist, and also a subjectavist.
    PS I noticed a couple of words (like “qis …”) where you should include a space: “q is …”.

    Also: Where you wrote: ‘Skepticism about a problem q is true iff, there exists x such that x is a correct solution to q AND if y is a correct solution to q, x equals y AND it is unknowable that x is the correct solution to q’…. I dunno – this just seems a bit like something is missing. Does y not get another mention? Why mention him in the first place? The formal description seems to be going toward the Mysteriism idea more, which is kinda where I was expecting to see it land.

  2. Thanks for your feedback. I’ll redefine pluralism so as to more clearly rule out subjectivism (you may think that’s cheating, but definitions and borders are pretty arbitary round these parts.) I’ll take another gander at the skepticism section as well.

  3. Tristan Haze says:

    Very interesting topic! I think maybe some of your ‘formal’ definitions involve a kind of false rigour that doesn’t really acheive anything except to make what you say take a bit longer to read and seem more technical. For example, I can’t see any advantage in clarity or precision of ‘Light-weight realism is true about metaphysics iff, for all x, if x is a metaphysical commitment, then x is really only about our concepts and not the structure of the world’ over, say, ‘Light-weight realism about metaphysics is the view that all metaphysical commitments are really about our concepts, and not the structure of the world’.

    • Because if I’m going to give formal definitions for some, I must for all, however thin!

      • Tristan Haze says:

        Maybe you don’t need the variable-quantifier apparatus for any of them. But if it turns out you do, fair enough. Another quibble I have is that it’s not clear the term ‘formal’ is really justified here, the way it’s most often used nowadays. Definitions or accounts given in terms of mathematical constructions (like Chalmers’s two-dimensional definitions of concepts like ‘a priori’, ‘necessary’ etc. can definitely be called formal. Definitions or accounts given in formal languages can likewise be called formal. But your definitions are really just informal (non-formalized), natural language definitions, where natural language is enriched with things like variables and brackets. Maybe you should just call them definitions and drop ‘formal’. It wouldn’t matter so much if ‘formal’ didn’t carry a positive connotation, suggesting thoroughness and precision etc. Since it does, your use of the term may create an unfavourable impression that you’re trying to give some of that impression without quite having a right to it.

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