Philosophers’ Carnival #155

Another month, another Philosophers’ Carnival. Philosophers’ Carnival #155 if I’m not mistaken. This month we have a rich crop of formal content, but never fear if that’s not your area- we’ve much other stuff too. Thanks to all who submitted, and all those who read. Without further ado, here are our entries:

 

 

Further Thoughts on Reductio Proofs– by Catarina Dulith Novaes at M-Phi (cross-posted at NewAPPS).

Catarina discusses the concept of the reductio proof and makes this reader quite impressed.

 

 

Inconsistency in Mathematics – by Jeffrey Ketland at M-Phi.

Jeffrey explores the intersection of the epistemic theory of truth, and mathematical inconsistency.

 

 

The Elenchus and Socrates’ Ideal of the Philosophical Life – by Louis WIlliam Rose at the Florida Student Philosophy Blog.

Louis takes a close look at the life, person, ideas and philosophy of life of Socrates of Athens.

 

 

Progress in Logical Priors – by Abram Demski at In Search of Logic.

Abram considers issues at the intersection of probability theory and logic, beyond my ken I must confess, but it seems fascinating.

 

 

Apparent Vagueness and Graded Harms – by Richard Yetter Chappell at Philosophy et cetera.

Vagueness and normative ethics might seem to be at opposite ends of the concerns of academic philosophy. Not so says Richard who explores their overlap from the perspective of his famously trenchant utilitarianism.

 

 

Graded Propositional Knowledge – by Blake Myers at Brains (cross-posted at Experimental Philosophy).

Can propositional knowledge come in degrees? Blake thinks so.

 

 

Introspective Attention: Transparency or Acquaintance? Part 1 – by Wayne Wu at Brains.

Introspection? Is it immediate or mediated, definite or doubtable? Philosophers have been chewing these questions for a long time now. Wayne wants to know as well, considering questions of introspective attention.

 

 

Preface and Reflection – by Jon Kvanvig at Certain Doubts.

What are we to make of the preface paradox? A question that has kept many a formal epistemologist up at night. Does Jon have the answers? Find out here.

 

 

Three Dimensions of Disagreement about Emotional Experience – by Eric Schwitzgebel at The Splintered Mind.

Emotions seem to present themselves so directly to us that the question of inaccuracy or disagreement over their nature might seem odd or even inapt. Eric taxonimises disagreement about emotion.

 

 

The Computational Theory of the Laws of Nature – by Terrance Tomkow at Tomkow.com.

What is the best formal theory of what a law of nature is? Terrance has a few thoughts.

 

 

Meaningless Identities – by Robbie at Metaphysical Values.

How to make sense of identity statements? A long vexed problem since they seem to be either trivial or meaningless. Robbie throws his hat into the ring.

 

 

Goldberg and the Problem of Anonymous Assertions – by Elisa Freschi at sanscrite cogitare, sanscrite loqui.

Indian philosophy and philosophy of language meet in Elisa’s fascinating blogpost.

 

 

 Whose Freedom? – by Timothy Scriven

And lastly (and most definitely leastly), you can find my consideration of the intersection of capitalism, communism and accounts of freedom here.

 

Next edition will be at Sprachlogik. Submit your work or someone else’s work here: http://philosophycarnival.blogspot.com

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About timothyscriven

I study philosophy at Sydney University. In the grand scheme, I'm not very important.
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4 Responses to Philosophers’ Carnival #155

  1. Jason Zarri says:

    Your links seem to be broken.

  2. Sorry! I will fix it tomorrow. For now, use Google.

  3. Pingback: Philosophers’ Carnival #155 | Brains

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